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Abstract
We analyze a model of vertical differentiation in which retailers
compete in product lines and may purchase a high quality good from a
monopolist. The low quality good is produced by a competitive fringe.
Depending on quality and cost differentials, the product lines chosen
by retailers in equilibrium are either identical, completely different
or partially overlapping. In the absence of upstream market power,
the unique equilibrium is for retailers to offer identical product lines.
Product line differentiation emerges as a result of strategic effects.
Key-words: Product line rivalry, vertical contracting, market
power, retailing.
JEL Classification: D43, L13, L42, L81.
1 Introduction
This paper examines the determinants of the product lines offered by com-
peting retailers. One characteristic of retailers is that they generally don’t
produce the goods they sell, but rather purchase these goods from producers
on wholesale markets. Commonly, producers have some market power. As
we show, upstream market power impacts on retailers’ product line choices.
In other words, equilibrium product lines will be different from the product
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lines that would obtain with competitive supply on wholesale markets. We
know no other paper focusing on this point.
We consider a model of vertical differentiation with two qualities and
assume that the high quality is produced by a monopolist, while the low
quality is produced by a competitive industry. Consumers are supplied by
two identical retailers. Because we focus on demand side aspects of product
line differentiation, we assume that each variety is produced at constant mar-
ginal cost. In particular there are no economies of scope. We determine the
subgame-perfect equilibria of a multi-stage game in which the manufacturer
first offers a contract to retailers, then retailers choose their product lines
and finally compete on the final market à la Cournot.
In this game of vertical contracting with downstream firms engaged in
product line rivalry, the manufacturer chooses its contract offer in order to
induce the product lines that are most profitable to it. Depending on cost and
quality differentials between the two varieties of the good, this can be either
head-to-head competition, complete differentiation or partial differentiation,
that is, both retailers sell the low quality good, but only one of them sells the
high quality good. The paper provides a complete discussion of the strategic
effects at work in the model.
This paper is related to previous work on product line rivalry. Bran-
der and Eaton (1984) define a multi-stage game in which firms first choose
their product lines and then compete on the market. There are two pairs of
varieties available to firms and Brander and Eaton examine whether firms
prefer to operate on a segmented market, each selling one of the two pairs
of varieties, or on an interlaced market, each selling one variety of each pair,
which leads to tougher competition but can be profitable when firms face
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entry threats. Champsaur and Rochet (1989) consider a model in which
firms offer intervals of qualities to heterogenous consumers and show that in
equilibrium it is not in the interest of a firm to offer a quality range that
overlaps its competitor’s quality range. DeFraja (1996) examines the same
issue of whether all the potential varieties are offered. Contrary to Champ-
saur and Rochet (1989) in which product lines are completely differentiated,
in DeFraja (1996) firms compete head-to-head in equilibrium. The differ-
ence in outcomes is probably related to the fact that competition on each
variety is à la Bertrand in Champsaur and Rochet (1989) and à la Cournot
in DeFraja (1996). The issue of whether firms differentiate their product
lines or compete head-to-head is addressed in Gilbert and Matutes (1993)
in yet another setting in which firms are differentiated by both quality and
brand name. All of these contributions implicitly assume that firms pur-
chase their inputs from competitive fringes. While this assumption may be
justified for some industries, it is not true for a wide variety of retailing
activities.1 Retailers purchase some varieties of the good, if not all, from
producers that enjoy significant market power and are thus in a position to
impose contractual conditions to retailers. Of course, the retailer can refuse
these conditions but then it will not be able to offer the variety to consumers,
a big difference compared with purchasing from competitive industries. In
this paper, we examine the implications for product lines of the presence
of market power at the manufacturing stage. Dobson and Waterson (1996)
1A prominent example is the European car market where car retailers are clearly price
takers on the wholesale market. Klemperer (1992) assumes the absence of upstream market
power, but takes into account an element that is relevant for the retailing sector, namely
the existence of "shopping costs". He shows that while firms would prefer differentiated
product lines in the absence of shopping costs, due to Bertrand competition, they may
make higher profits with head-to-head competition in the presence of shopping costs.
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consider precisely this issue, but they use a very different setting and it is dif-
ficult to compare their results with ours. Firstly, they don’t consider vertical
differentiation, but two-dimensional horizontal differentiation: products are
horizontally differentiated, as well as retailers. Secondly, they consider linear
pricing on the intermediate market, so that double-marginalization plays a
central role in their paper. Firms can sign exclusive dealing contracts and
then use monetary transfers. Thus there is a link between exclusive dealing
and the resolution of the double-marginalization problem. In contrast, we
assume that the manufacturer offers two part tariffs, thus eliminating the
double-marginalization issue and introducing rent-sharing effects. Moreover,
the manufacturer cannot sign exclusive dealing agreements with retailers. If
exclusivity emerges in our model, it is because one of the retailers refuses the
contract offered by the manufacturer. Finally, Dobson and Waterson clearly
focus on the antitrust aspects of exclusive dealing agreements, while we are
primarily interested in the product lines offered by retailers. Introducing ex-
clusive dealing contracts is a possible extension of our model (more on this
in the conclusion).
The plan of the paper is as follows: in section 2, we present the model
and solve the downstream competition stage of the game; in section 3, we
determine the contract offered by the manufacturer in equilibrium and the
resulting product lines. Section 4 concludes.
2 The model
We consider an industry with two identical downstream retailers, D1 andD2,
who buy from an upstream producer ("the manufacturer" in what follows),
and a competitive fringe, ("the fringe"). The manufacturer produces a high
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quality product at constant marginal cost c ≥ 0 while the competitive fringe
produces a low quality product at constant marginal cost of zero. The retail-
ing costs are also zero. Let qH = 1 be the high quality and qL = q < 1 be the
low quality. There is a unit mass of consumers, each of whom is interested
in buying at most one unit. The utility of consumers is of the Mussa-Rosen
(1978) type: each consumer obtains a utility θqk − pk if he buys one unit of
good k, k = L,H, where θ is distributed uniformly on the interval [0, 1], and
a utility of zero if he does not buy at all. Given consumers’ preferences, the
demand functions are YH = 1− pH−pL1−q and YL =
pH−pL
1−q −
pL
q .
We denote respectively by yiH and y
i
L the quantity of the high quality and
the low quality product offered by Di. Inverting demand functions for the
two qualities leads to:
½
pL = (1− y1H − y2H − y1L − y2L) q
pH = 1− y1H − y2H − (y1L + y2L) q
(1)
We assume that c ≤ 1− q.2
2.1 The game
The strategic interactions between upstream and downstream firms are rep-
resented by a three stage game:
Stage 1: The manufacturer proposes to D1 and D2 an identical two-part
tariff, T (yiH) = wy
i
H + F, i = 1, 2.
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Stage 2: Retailers simultaneously accept or refuse the contract offered by
the manufacturer. If a retailer accepts the contract, it pays the fixed fee at
this stage.
2This assumption ensures that the high quality will be offered to consumers in equilib-
rium.
3This assumption is discussed in section 3.
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Stage 3: Retailers simultaneously choose (yiH , y
i
L)i=1,2.
Information in this game is both complete and perfect. In particular,
contracts are public and cannot be secretly renegotiated.4 We solve the
game by backward induction.
The product lines that will actually be offered depend on the decision of
retailers to accept the contract proposed by the manufacturer (stage 2) and
to offer the varieties of the good to which they have access (stage 3). In
particular, retailers linked to the manufacturer by a contract may choose not
to offer the low quality good in stage 3. In the next subsection, we derive
the equilibrium outputs of retailers in the stage 3-subgames.
2.2 The downstream Cournot-Nash equilibrium
If both retailers accept the contract in stage 2, they compete on an equal
basis in stage 3, since both have access to the low quality good for free and
to the high quality good at wholesale price w. Let yH (w,w), yL (w,w) be
the quantities of high quality good and low quality good offered by each firm
in the symmetrical Cournot-Nash equilibrium. We denote by π (w,w) the
corresponding profit (gross of the franchise fee), that is,
π (w,w) = pLyL (w,w) + (pH − w) yH (w,w) .
Lemma 1 When both firms accept the contract (w,F ) in stage 2, yH (w,w) =
1−q−w
3(1−q) and yL (w,w) =
w
3(1−q) for 0 ≤ w ≤ 1 − q, yH (w,w) = 0 and
4If we instead assume that contracts are offered secretly or that public offers can be
secretly renegotiated, the manufacturer faces a commitment problem, as in Rey and Ti-
role (2003). Essentially, the manufacturer cannot choose the number of retailers. While
supplying only one retailer would maximize its profits, it supplies both retailers, because
it cannot commit not to do so. Industry profits are equal to the non-cooperative duopoly
profits instead of the monopoly profit. In terms of product lines, there is no differentiation.
Nevertheless, if we assume both that contracts are secret and that the manufacturer is
able to commit to supply only one retailer, supplying only one firm may be an equilibrium.
This commitment may be achieved through technology choices.
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yL (w,w) = 13 for w ≥ 1− q.
Proof. This is the Cournot-Nash equilibrium to the sub-game.¤
Corollary 1 π (w,w) = (1−w)
2−q(1−2w)
9(1−q) for 0 ≤ w ≤ 1− q and π (w,w) =
q
9
for w ≥ 1− q.
Note that lemma 1 also describes the outputs that would result in equilib-
rium if the high quality good was supplied by a competitive fringe producing
at constant marginal cost w rather than by an upstream monopolist.
If only one retailer accepts the contract, it is at a competitive advantage in
stage 3. Let yH (w,N), yL (w,N) be the high quality and low quality output
of this retailer, where N denotes no access to the high quality product. We
denote by π (w,N) the profit of this retailer. The other retailer sells only
the low quality good. We denote its output by yL (N,w) and its profit by
π (N,w). Profits are given by
π (w,N) = pLyL (w,N)+(pH − w) yH (w,N) and π (N,w) = pLyL (N,w) .
Lemma 2 When only one retailer accepts the contract (w,F ) in stage 2,
yH (w,N) =
2−q−2w
4−q , yL (w,N) = 0, yL (N,w) =
1+w
4−q for 0 ≤ w ≤
1−q
3
,
yH (w,N) =
1−q−w
2(1−q) , yL (w,N) =
3w−(1−q)
6(1−q) , yL (N,w) =
1
3
for 1−q
3
≤ w ≤ 1−q,
yH (w,N) = 0, yL (w,N) = yL (N,w) = 13 for w ≥ 1− q.
Proof. This is the Cournot-Nash equilibrium to the sub-game.¤
Corollary 2
(π (w,N) , π (N,w)) =
µ³
2−q−2w
4−q
´2
,
³
1+w
4−q
´2
q
¶
for 0 ≤ w ≤ 1−q
3
,
(π (w,N) , π (N,w)) =
³
5q2−q(14−18w)+9(1−w)2
36(1−q) ,
q
9
´
for 1−q
3
≤ w ≤ 1− q,
π (w,N) = π (N,w) = q
9
for w ≥ 1− q.
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Note that the retailer that accepts the contract doesn’t necessarily offer
the low quality good, although it can get it for free from the competitive
fringe. When interbrand competition within the retailer would be too tough,
the retailer refuses to offer the low quality good and the differentiation in
product line is complete. Note also that when the retailer offers both qualities
to consumers, w has an impact on yH (w,N) and yL (w,N), but no longer on
yL (N,w). In this situation of partial product line differentiation, the retailer
substitutes between the two qualities, but this has no impact on the output
of its competitor.
Corollary 2 shows that, for 1−q
3
≤ w, w has no impact on the profit of the
retailer not supplied by the manufacturer. Changes in the wholesale price
induce changes in the proportion of high and low quality in the output of
the supplied retailer, but not its total output. The profit function of the
competitor is thus unaffected (see the expression of pL in (1)). This result is
useful for the resolution of stages 1 and 2, since this profit is the reservation
profit of a retailer when its competitor accepts the contract.
If both retailers refuse the contract, they compete on the low quality
good. In equilibrium, both offer yL (N,N).
Lemma 3 When both firms refuse the contract in stage 2, yH (N,N) = 0
and yL (N,N) = 13 .
Proof. Consequence of lemma (1).¤
Corollary 3 π (N,N) = q
9
Having solved the downstream competition game, in the next section we
analyze the impact of upstream market power on equilibrium product line
differentiation.
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3 Vertical contracting equilibrium and prod-
uct lines
Given our assumption on c and q, the high quality good will be offered
on the final market.5 The issue is whether it will be offered by one or
two retailers. This depends on the size of the franchise fee charged by
the manufacturer. In any case, the manufacturer chooses F such that re-
tailers’ participation constraints are binding. The franchise fee will be set
at F = π (w,w) − π (N,w) when the manufacturer supplies both retailers.
We denote by wDD the wholesale price that maximizes the manufacturer’s
profit in this case. wDD is the solution of Maxw
Φ (w,w), with Φ (w,w) =
2 [(w − c) yH (w,w) + π (w,w)− π (N,w)]. When the manufacturer supplies
only one retailer, the franchise fee will be set at π (w,N) − π (N,N). De-
noting the profit maximizing price by wD, we have wD = ArgMaxw
Φ (w,N),
with Φ (w,N) = (w − c) yH (w,N)+π (w,N)−π (N,N). Above this thresh-
old, no retailer accepts the contract. We provide below the expressions of
wD and wDD.
Lemma 4
wD =
⎧
⎨
⎩
0, if (q ≤ eq and c ≤ c0 (q)) or (q ≥ eq and c ≤ ca (q))
2c(4−q)−(2−q)q
4(2−q) , if (q ≤ eq and c0 (q) ≤ c ≤ ca (q))
c, if c ≥ ca (q)
(2)
where eq ' 0.721, c0 (q) = (2−q)q2(4−q) and ca (qL)=
⎧
⎨
⎩
√
2−3q+q2
3
√
2
, if q ≤ eq
(1−q)√q(3√q+2
√
2+q)
3(4−q) , if q ≥ eq .
Proof.
5Indeed, the manufacturer can propose a contract that is (weakly) profitable for it and
acceptable to retailers. Offering the good at marginal cost without a franchise fee, as a
competitive fringe would do, is one such contract.
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Given the expressions of yH (w,N), π (w,N) and π (N,N) (see lemma 2
and corollaries 2 and 3),
Φ (w,N) =
⎧
⎨
⎩
(w − c)
³
2−q−2w
4−q
´
+
³
2−q−2w
4−q
´2
− q
9
for w ∈
£
0; 1−q
3
¤
(w − c)
³
1−q−w
2(1−q)
´
+ 5q
2−q(14−18w)+9(1−w)2
36(1−q) −
q
9
for w ∈
£
1−q
3
; 1− q
¤
Φ is strictly concave on each interval and continuous at w = 1−q
3
. We
solve the program on each interval and compare the solutions to determine
wD.¤
Figure 1 below plots the threshold values that appear in lemma 4.
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Figure 1: Threshold values when one retailer is supplied
Note that for c < ca (q) , wD < c. Given the nature of downstream
competition, precommitment effects give the manufacturer an incentive to
charge a wholesale price below marginal cost. The supplied retailer is more
aggressive in stage 3 and makes higher profits, since the outputs of retailers
are strategic substitutes.6 Thus, the producer can charge a larger fixed fee.
However, there is a trade-off here since selling below c is costly. Lemma 4
shows that this is an optimal strategy for c < ca, but not for c ≥ ca.7
6See Caillaud and Rey (1995) for a discussion of precommitment effects.
7Since the retailer’s reservation profit is a constant, wD is the wholesale price that
maximizes the joint profits of the manufacturer and the supplied retailer.
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Lemma 5
wDD =
⎧
⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎩
0 for (0 ≤ c ≤ c1 (q) and q ∈ [bq; 1])
−16−3c(−4+q)2+42q−27q2+q3
2(−32+7q+7q2) for
(0 ≤ c ≤ c2 (q) and qL ∈ [0; bq])
or (c1 (q) ≤ c ≤ c2 (q) and q ∈ [bq; 1])
1
4
(1 + 3c− q) for c2 (q) ≤ c ≤ 1− q
(3)
where bq = 13− 3√17 ' 0.63, c1 (q) = (−16+26q−q2)(1−q)3(4−q)2 and
c2 (q) = 19
³
−15 + 3q + 2
√
2
p
32− 7q − 7q2
´
.
Proof. Given the expressions of yH (w,w), π (w,w) and π (N,w) (see
lemma 1 and corollaries 1 and 2),
Φ (w,w) =
⎧
⎪⎨
⎪⎩
2
∙
(w − c) (1−q)−w
3(1−q) +
(1−w)2−q(1−2w)
9(1−q) −
³
1+w
4−q
´2
q
¸
for w ∈
£
0; 1−q
3
¤
2
h
(w − c) (1−q)−w
3(1−q) +
(1−w)2−q(1−2w)
9(1−q) −
q
9
i
for w ∈
£
1−q
3
; 1− q
¤
Φ (w,w) is strictly concave on each interval, continuous at w = 1−q
3
. We
solve the program on each interval and compare the solutions to determine
wDD.¤
Figure 2 below plots the threshold values that appear in lemma 5.
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Figure 2: Threshold values when both retailers are supplied
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When the manufacturer supplies both retailers, the rent left to each
retailer is an increasing function of the wholesale price below 1−q
3
and a
constant above 1−q
3
(see corollary 2). Since 1
4
(1 + 3c− q) > 1−q
3
, while
−16−3c(−4+q)2+42q−27q2+q3
2(−32+7q+7q2) <
1−q
3
, lemma 5 shows that for c ≥ c2, the man-
ufacturer maximizes the profits of the industry, while for c ≤ c2, it distorts
the wholesale price, no longer maximizes the profits of the industry, but
leaves lower rents to retailers.
The remainder of this section is devoted to the determination of product
lines offered by retailers in equilibrium.
Proposition 1 Equilibrium product lines are as follows:
(i) If c ≥ ca, the manufacturer is indifferent to the number of retailers.
If only one retailer is supplied, it sells both qualities and the other retailer
sells only the low quality good. If both retailers are supplied, they sell both
qualities.
(ii) If cb ≤ c < ca, the manufacturer supplies only one retailer. This
retailer provides only the high quality while the other retailer provides only
the low quality.
(iii) If c < cb, the manufacturer supplies both retailers. The two retailers
either provide only the high quality or both high and low qualities.
The threshold value cb is a continuous function of q on [0; 1] defined by
cb =
⎧
⎨
⎩
−90+153q−72q2+9q3+
√
3
√
2560−9520q+13112q2−7290q3+277q4+1162q5−301q6
−42−60q+48q2 on
£
0; q
¤
(1−q)√q
√q(−138+51q+6q2)+
√
3
√
−640+3980q−2140q2−557q3+322q4+7q5

3(−4+q)3 on
£
q; 1
¤ ,
(4)
where q ' 0.389.
Proof. See appendix.¤
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We plot in figure 3 the threshold values that appear in proposition 1.
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Figure 3: Threshold values in proposition 1
If we compare the equilibrium product lines described in proposition 1
with those that would obtain if retailers purchased both qualities from com-
petitive industries, we see that, along with head-to-head competition, new
equilibria appear: partial product differentiation and complete product line
differentiation. The partial product line differentiation equilibrium reflects
the ability of the manufacturer to replicate the equilibrium where both re-
tailers are supplied by another one in which only one retailer is supplied.
In other words, at least for some values of cost and quality parameters, the
number of retailers supplied by the manufacturer does not influence the man-
ufacturer’s profit. This result is similar to others found in the literature (see,
e.g., Rey and Tirole (2003)). However, the complete product line differen-
tiation equilibrium reflects the fact that this indifference result doesn’t hold
over the whole range of values of the parameters. For some values of cost
and quality, the manufacturer is strictly better off when supplying only one
retailer. In general, the number of retailers does influence the manufacturer’s
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profits. Because of this, upstream market power has a significant impact not
only on prices, but also on the product lines offered by retailers to customers.
We provide the intuition for this result below.
For q = 0, the arm’s length relationship subgame is a special case of the
"commitment game" defined by McAfee and Schwartz (1994). They show
that in these games the manufacturer’s profit is independent of the number
of retailers supplied with the high quality good. Proposition 1 shows that
this independence result doesn’t hold any more when we introduce a second,
inferior, but strictly positive quality of the good supplied by a competitive
industry (q > 0). In particular, in some situations, the manufacturer strictly
prefers to supply only one retailer and the differentiation of product lines is
complete. The intuition for this result is as follows.
Regardless of the number of retailers it supplies, the manufacturer has
to decide whether to charge a wholesale price higher or lower than 1−q
3
. In
the first case, it will maximize the profit of the industry and capture it,
up to a constant. In the second case, it will distort the wholesale price
away from the value that maximizes the profit of the industry in order to
commit the supplied retailer to be tough in the final market (if one retailer
is supplied) or to reduce the rents left to the retailers (if both retailers are
supplied). Note that there is no incentive to distort wholesale prices when
q = 0 because there is no strategic interaction on the final market when only
one retailer is supplied and no rents left to retailers when both are supplied.
This is why supplying one or two retailers is equivalent in this case. Optimal
prices for q = 0 are w∗ = c when one retailer is supplied and w∗∗ = 1+3c
4
when both retailers are supplied. The output of high quality good is 1−c
2
in both cases. Let us consider a very small value ε > 0 of the low quality
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q. Because profits are continuous functions of q for any given w, optimal
wholesale prices wD and wDD for q = ε will be very close to w∗ and w∗∗
respectively. Distorting wholesale prices to values that are far from w∗ and
w∗∗ cannot be profitable. Let us now examine what this implies for different
values of c. First, take c = 1−ε
2
. Both w∗ and w∗∗ are clearly above 1−q
3
. This
implies that wD and wDD are also above
1−q
3
. There are no distortions away
from the wholesale prices that maximize industry profits and the equivalence
between supplying one and two retailers holds. Now, take c = 1−q
3
. w∗∗ is
still above 1−q
3
, while w∗ is equal to 1−q
3
. When supplying both retailers, the
manufacturer will chargewDD =
1−q
2
> 1−q
3
. When supplying one retailer, the
manufacturer can obtain the same profits by charging w = 1−q
3
. However,
charging w close to 1−q
3
, but strictly lower leads to strictly higher profits,
because of the commitment effect. Supplying one retailer is thus strictly
better than supplying both retailers. The same argument would apply for
any specification of costs and demand such that wD = c and wDD > c for
some value of c. Finally, for c = 0, the situation is much more intricate
because the manufacturer distorts both in the case when it supplies one
retailer and when it supplies both. It turns out that it makes higher profits
supplying both retailers. To see the intuition for this result, let us make the
further assumption that q ≥ bq. Then, wD = wDD = 0. If the manufacturer
supplies only one retailer (say D1), it gets π (0;N)− π (N,N). If it supplies
both retailers, it gets 2 [π (0, 0)− π (N, 0)]. Thus, it supplies both retailers
iff
π (0, 0)− π (N, 0) > π (0, N)− π (0, 0)− [π (N,N)− π (N, 0)] . (5)
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The interpretation for this inequality is as follows: The increase in D2’s
profit, π (0, 0) − π (N, 0), must be larger than the decrease in D1’s profit,
π (0, N)−π (0, 0), minus the reduction in the rent left toD1. Since π (N,N)−
π (N, 0) > 0, a sufficient condition for (5) to hold is 2π (0, 0) > π (0, N) +
π (N, 0).
The results presented in proposition 1 don’t critically hinge on the as-
sumption that the manufacturer offers the same contract to both retailers.
If we relax this assumption and allow the manufacturer to propose public
but discriminatory contracts to retailers, equilibrium wholesale prices and
franchise fees will change, but the manufacturer is still not able to replicate
monopoly profits.8 With discriminatory contracts, the manufacturer has four
instruments instead of two at its disposal to maximize profits and try to repli-
cate monopoly profits. Even when both retailers offer the high quality good
in equilibrium, in general they will pay different wholesale prices to the man-
ufacturer. This contrasts with proposition 1. However, the resolution of the
game (not presented here) shows that there are still values of the parameters
for which one of the retailers doesn’t offer the high quality. These are in fact
corner cases in which the contract offered by the manufacturer to one of the
retailers is such that it is not accepted or it is accepted but the retailer’s
equilibrium strategy is not to offer the high quality on the final market. In
some cases this will lead to partial product line differentiation, in others to
complete product line differentiation. To sum up, what happens when we
relax the assumption of non-discriminatory contracts is essentially that in-
stead of switching from completely symmetrical market equilibria to product
line differentiation equilibria, market equilibria are in general asymmetrical.
8Contracts contingent on the retailers’ decisions would allow the manufacturer to repli-
cate monopoly profits. They would also raise serious antitrust concerns.
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One of the retailers’ high quality offers is less than the other’s and in some
cases it is zero.
4 Conclusion
In this paper, we analyze product line differentiation between retailers com-
peting on a vertically differentiated market. The specific feature of our model
is that we analyze the contractual relations between retailers and manufac-
turers. As far as we know, this has not been done before. This feature proves
to be crucial for the determination of product line differentiation. Indeed, the
usual result of irrelevance of the number of retailers supplied for the manu-
facturer’s profit doesn’t hold in the situation that we examine. Since product
lines depend on the contract offered by the manufacturer, the preferences of
the manufacturer as regards the number of retailers offering the high qual-
ity good translate into different product lines. Typically, for a given value
of the quality differential, when the cost differential is high, the relevance
result holds and there are two equilibria, head-to-head competition and par-
tial differentiation. For intermediate and low values of the cost differential,
the manufacturer strictly prefers either to supply both retailers, which leads
to head-to-head competition, or to supply only one retailer, which leads to
complete differentiation.
Our model is specific but provides general insights and can be useful to
analyze the retailing of a wide variety of products. A possible extension is
to introduce exclusive dealing contracts in the picture. Recall that, in our
model, when the manufacturer supplies both retailers, it distorts wholesale
prices away from the values that maximize the profit of the industry in order
to reduce the rents left to retailers. Because of this distortion, the profit of
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the industry may be larger when only one retailer is supplied. However, this
is not the best strategy for the manufacturer because it would then leave a
large rent to the (unique) retailer. Consider an amendment to the model
to allow retailers to offer exclusive contracts to the manufacturer. Suppose
that industry profits are larger when only one retailer offers the high quality
good.9 The retailers will compete to be the unique retailer. Thus, the rent
left to this retailer will be lower and the manufacturer will accept an exclu-
sive dealing contract. Vertical integration may be another way to increase
industry profits. Vertical integration differs from exclusive dealing in that
it provides enough flexibility to supply non-affiliates and yet favor the affili-
ate. A vertically integrated retailer may want to supply a limited but posi-
tive amount of high quality good to its downstream competitor, who would
otherwise purchase more inferior good from the competitive fringe. Thus,
vertical integration may be preferred to exclusive dealing.10 Since these ver-
tical arrangements are relevant, equilibrium product lines may change when
introducing them in the model. Indeed, exclusive dealing involves complete
product line differentiation, while vertical integration involves partial prod-
uct line differentiation.11
9The previous arguments suggest that this assumption is plausible.
10However, the drawback of vertical integration as compared to exclusive dealing is that
the integrated firm cannot use internal transfer prices to commit to a soft or tough attitude
in the final market. Depending on which of the two effects is stronger, one can expect
either vertical integration or exclusive dealing in equilibrium. More on this in Avenel and
Caprice (2003).
11Avenel and Caprice (2003) examine the antitrust issues raised by exclusive dealing
and vertical integration in such a framework.
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5 Appendix: Proof of proposition 1
It is useful for this proof to define Π (wD, N) = (wD − c) yH (wD, N) +
π (wD, N) andΠ (wDD, wDD) = 2 (wDD − c) yH (wDD, wDD)+2π (wDD, wDD)−
π (N,wDD). If the manufacturer supplies one retailer, its profit isΦ (wD, N) =
Π (wD, N) − π (N,N). Supplying two retailers, it earns Φ (wDD, wDD) =
Π (wDD, wDD) − π (N,wDD). The proof relies on the comparison between
these two expressions. Given that the expressions of wD and wDD depend
on c and q, we consider successively the different domains of values of these
parameters.
1. We first take c > ca(q). Since ca (q) > c2 (q), wD = c >
1−q
3
and
wDD =
1+3c−q
4
> c > 1−q
3
, so that
Π (wD, N) =
5q2 − q (14− 18c) + 9 (1− c)2
36 (1− q) (6)
and
Π (wDD, wDD) = 2
µ
1 + 3c− q
4
− c
¶
(1− q)− 1+3c−q
4
3 (1− q)
+ 2
¡
1− 1+3c−q
4
¢2 − q ¡1− 21+3c−q
4
¢
9 (1− q) −
q
9
(7)
Simplifying the expression ofΠ (wDD, wDD) leads toΠ (wD, N) = Π (wDD, wDD).
Moreover, since π (N,wDD) =
q
9
and is thus independent from wDD, it is
clear that π (N,N) = π (N,wDD).
We can thus conclude that Π (wD, N) − Π (wDD, wDD) = π (N,N) −
π (N,wDD) = 0 and consequently Φ (wD, N) = Φ (wDD, wDD).
For these values of marginal cost, the manufacturer is indifferent between
supplying one or two retailers. There are two equilibria.
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2. We then take c2 (q) < c < ca(q). Since wDD =
1+3c−q
4
> 1−q
3
, as in
the previous case, we have π (N,N)− π (N,wDD) = 0 and Π (wDD, wDD) is
given by the right-hand side of (6).
On the relevant range of values of c and q, c is either larger or lower than
1−q
3
. If c ≥ 1−q
3
, then Π (wDD, wDD) = Π (c,N) (see the previous case). If
c < 1−q
3
, then Π (wDD, wDD) < Π (c,N). Indeed,
d
dc [Π (c,N)−Π (wDD, wDD)] =
1
2
− 4(2−q)
(4−q)2 + 2
∙
4
(4− q)2
− 1
4 (1− q)
¸
| {z }
<0
c, so
that
d
dc [Π (c,N)−Π (wDD, wDD)] < 0 ⇔ c >
h
1
2
− 4(2−q)
(4−q)2
i
/2
h
4
(4−q)2 −
1
4(1−q)
i
,
which is inferior to c2. Π (c,N)−Π (wDD, wDD) is thus a decreasing function
on
£
c2 (q) ;
1−q
3
¤
, equal to zero for c = 1−q
3
. Thus Π (c,N)−Π (wDD, wDD) > 0
for c2 (q) < c < ca(q).
As regards wD, it is equal either to 0 or to
2c(4−q)−(2−q)q
4(2−q) . Since these
two values maximize Π (w,N) (because they maximize Φ (w,N) and the
two functions differ only by a constant) and are different from c, we have
Π (wD, N) > Π (c,N). Finally,
Π (wD, N)−Π (wDD, wDD) > π (N,N)− π (N,wDD) = 0 (8)
and
Φ (wD, N) > Φ (wDD, wDD) . (9)
The manufacturer supplies only one retailer. As regards product lines,
the retailer that obtains exclusivity offers only the high quality good, whereas
the other offers the low quality good. Indeed, both 0 and 2c(4−q)−(2−q)q
4(2−q) are
inferior to 1−q
3
for these values of parameters.
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3. We finally take c < c2 (q). Φ (wDD, wDD) − Φ (wD, N) is a piece-
wise, continuous function of c and q. For each value of q, we show that
Φ (wDD, wDD)−Φ (wD, N) is decreasing in c on each of the relevant subsets
of the interval [0, c2 (q)] and determine its sign on the limits of these sub-
sets. This enables us to determine on which subset this function takes the
zero value. This leads us to the conclusion that the solution of the equation
Φ (wDD, wDD)−Φ (wD, N) = 0 is a continuous piecewise function, that we de-
note by cb (q), such that cb ∈ [c0; c2] on
£
0; q
¤
, cb ∈ [0; c0] on
£
q; q
¤
, cb ∈ [0; c2]
on [q; bq] and cb ∈ [c1; c2] on [bq; 1], where q and q satisfy q < q < bq < eq. The
manufacturer selects only one retailer when c > cb (q) and two retailers when
c < cb (q).
As regards the expression of cb (q), numerical methods show that
cb =
⎧
⎨
⎩
−90+153q−72q2+9q3+
√
3
√
2560−9520q+13112q2−7290q3+277q4+1162q5−301q6
−42−60q+48q2 on
£
0; q
¤
(1−q)√q
√q(−138+51q+6q2)+
√
3
√
−640+3980q−2140q2−557q3+322q4+7q5

3(−4+q)3 on
£
q; 1
¤
(10)
We provide below the details of the third part of the proof.
(a) The first step is to determine the expressions of wD and wDD. Using
the fact that c2 (q) ≤ ca, that c0 < c2 if and only if qL < q, with q < eq
and that c1 ≤ c0 on [0; 1] and c1 ≥ 0 iff q ≥ bq, with bq > eq, we rewrite the
expressions of wD and wDD as follows :
(wD, wDD) =
⎧
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
³
0, −16−3c(−4+q)
2+42q−27q2+q3
2(−32+7q+7q2)
´
for q ≤ q and 0 ≤ c ≤ c0³
2c(4−q)−(2−q)q
4(2−q) ,
−16−3c(−4+q)2+42q−27q2+q3
2(−32+7q+7q2)
´
for
½
q ≤ q and
c0 ≤ c ≤ c2³
0, −16−3c(−4+q)
2+42q−27q2+q3
2(−32+7q+7q2)
´
for q ≤ q ≤ bq and 0 ≤ c ≤ c2
(0, 0) for bq ≤ q and c ≤ c1³
0, −16−3c(−4+q)
2+42q−27q2+q3
2(−32+7q+7q2)
´
for bq ≤ q and c1 ≤ c ≤ c2
(11)
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(b) The second step is to study Φ (wDD, wDD)−Φ (wD, N) on each inter-
val.
For q ∈ [bq; 1] and c ∈ [0; c1] ,Φ (wDD, wDD)−Φ (wD, N) = −2cyH (0, 0) +
2π (0, 0)− 2π (N, 0)− (−cyH (0, N) + π (0, N)− π (N,N))
= − 2+q
3(4−q)c+
2+q
9
− 2q
(4−q)2 −
³
2−q
4−q
´2
.
This is a decreasing function of c. Numerical calculations show that it is
positive for c = c1. As a consequence, Φ (wDD, wDD)−Φ (wD, N) is positive
on [0; c1] for q ∈ [bq; 1].
For q ∈ [bq; 1] and c ∈ [c1; c2] ,
Φ (wDD, wDD)−Φ (wD, N) = 2 (wDD − c) yH (wDD, wDD)+2π (wDD, wDD)−
2π (N,wDD)− (−cyH (0, N) + π (0, N)− π (N,N))
= −
³
4
9(1−q) +
2q
(4−q)2
´
w2DD+
³
2
9
− 4q
(4−q)2
´
wDD− 2+q3(4−q)c+
2
3
wDD
1−q c+K where
K is independent from c and wDD =
−16−3c(−4+q)2+42q−27q2+q3
2(−32+7q+7q2) . Deriving this
expression with respect to c leads to :
d
dc [Φ (wDD, wDD)− Φ (wD, N)] < 0⇐⇒ c <
(1−q)q(46−17q−2q2)
(4−q)3 .
This condition is satisfied, since for the values of q that we consider,
numerical calculations show that c2 <
(1−q)q(46−17q−2q2)
(4−q)3 . Furthermore, by
continuity of Φ (wDD, wDD)− Φ (wD, N),
Φ (wDD, wDD)− Φ (wD, N)|c=c1 > 0
and Φ (wDD, wDD)− Φ (wD, N)|c=c2 < 0. For q ∈ [bq; 1], there exists a
value cb (q) which is the unique solution of Φ (wDD, wDD) > Φ (wD, N) iff
c < cb (q).
For qL ∈ [q; bq] and c ∈ [0; c2], ddc [Φ (wDD, wDD)− Φ (wD, N)] < 0 ⇐⇒
c <
(1−q)q(46−17q−2q2)
(4−q)3 , which is verified, since c2 <
(1−q)q(46−17q−2q2)
(4−q)3 on the
interval. Furthermore, Φ (wDD, wDD)− Φ (wD, N)|c=0 > 0
and Φ (wDD, wDD)− Φ (wD, N)|c=c2 < 0.
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For q ∈ [0; q] and c ∈ [0; c0], ddc [Φ (wDD, wDD)− Φ (wD, N)] < 0⇐⇒ c <
(1−q)q(46−17q−2q2)
(4−q)3 and this condition is also verified, since c0 <
(1−q)q(46−17q−2q2)
(4−q)3
(numerical result). Furthermore, numerical calculations show that there ex-
ists a value q < q of q such that Φ (wDD, wDD)− Φ (wD, N)|c=c0 > 0 for
q < q and Φ (wDD, wDD)− Φ (wD, N)|c=c0 < 0 for q < q < q. We calculated
q ' 0.389. Finally, Φ (wDD, wDD)− Φ (wD, N)|c=0 > 0 (numerical result).
For q ∈
£
0; q
¤
and c ∈ [c0; c2], the expression of Φ (wD, N) is modified.
Since wD <
1−q
3
, Φ (wD, N) = (wD − c)
³
2−q−2wD
4−q
´
+
³
2−q−2wD
4−q
´2
− q
9
. We
show that ddc [Φ (wDD, wDD)− Φ (wD, N)] < 0⇐⇒ c <
30−51q+24q2−3q3
2(7+10q−8q2) .
Numerical methods show that the right-hand side is above c2 on [0; 1].
The function is thus decreasing on the interval. By continuity, it takes neg-
ative values for c = c2 and positive values for c = c0.
Finally, the case q ∈
£
q; q
¤
and c ∈ [c0; c2] is similar to the previous one,
except for the fact that Φ (wDD, wDD)−Φ (wD, N) takes negative values for
c = c0.
To sum up, the number of supplied retailers, the wholesale price and the
resulting product lines are as follows :
For bq ≤ q and 0 ≤ c ≤ c1, the manufacturer supplies both retailers and
charges wDD = 0. The retailers distribute only the high quality good.
For q ≤ bq and 0 ≤ c ≤ cb or bq ≤ q and c1 ≤ c ≤ cb, the manufacturer
supplies both retailers and charges wDD =
−16−3c(−4+q)2+42q−27q2+q3
2(−32+7q+7q2) . The
retailers distribute both qualities.
For cb < c ≤ ca, the manufacturer supplies only one retailer and charges
wD = 0 for c ≤ c0, wD = 2c(4−q)−(2−q)q4(2−q) for c ≥ c0. In both cases, product line
differentiation is complete, i.e. one retailer sells the high quality good and
the other sells the low quality good, since both 0 and 2c(4−q)−(2−q)q
4(2−q) are less
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than 1−q
3
for the values of c and q considered.
For ca < c, the manufacturer is indifferent between supplying one retailer,
with wD = c, or two retailers, with wDD =
1+3c−q
4
. If the manufacturer
supplies only one retailer, this results in partial product line differentiation:
the supplied retailer sells both qualities and the other retailer sells the low
quality good. Indeed, wD > ca >
1−q
3
.¤
6 References
Avenel, E. and S. Caprice, 2003, Vertical integration, exclusive dealing and
product line differentiation in retailing, mimeo (available from the authors).
Brander, J. A., and J. Eaton, 1984, Product line rivalry, American Eco-
nomic Review, 74, 323-334.
Caillaud, B., Rey, P., 1995. Strategic aspects of delegation. European
Economic Review, 39, 421-431.
Champsaur, P., Rochet, J.-C. 1989. Multiproduct duopolists. Economet-
rica, 57(3), 533-557.
De Fraja, G., 1996. Product line competition in vertically differentiated
markets. International Journal of Industrial Organization 14, 389-414.
Dobson, P. and M. Waterson, 1996, Exclusive trading contracts in suc-
cessive differentiated duopoly, Southern Economic Journal, 63(2), 361-377.
Gilbert, R.J., Matutes, C. 1993. Product line rivalry with brand differ-
entiation. Journal of Industrial Economics, 41, 223-240.
Klemperer, P., 1992, Equilibrium product lines: Competing head-to-head
may be less competitive, American Economic Review, 82, 740-755.
McAfee, R. P. and M. Schwartz, 1994, Opportunism in multilateral ver-
tical contracting: Nondiscrimination, exclusivity, and uniformity, American
24
Economic Review, 84, 210-230.
Mussa, M., Rosen, S. 1978. Monopoly and Product Quality. Journal of
Economic Theory 18, 301-317.
Rey, P. and J. Tirole, 2003, A primer on foreclosure, forthcoming in
Handbook of Industrial Economics, vol. III, M. Armstrong and R. Porter
(Eds.).
25
